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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of a firm’s strategy 
to invest in a conflict location. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been 
done before. We start with the population of multinationals who have chosen 
to invest in low income countries with weak institutions. We then split this 
sample in order to distinguish between firms that have invested in conflict 
regions compared to those that haven’t. Our analysis then proceeds to explain 
the decision of those firms to invest in conflict locations by using a simple 
Probit model. We find that countries with weaker institutions and less concern 
about corporate social responsibility (CSR) are more likely to invest in 
conflict regions. Finally, firms with more concentrated ownership are more 
likely to invest in such locations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Conflict, corporate social responsibility, FDI, institutions. 
 2
INVESTING IN CONFLICT ZONES: A FIRM-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a long history of western companies being willing to invest in politically 
unstable locations, and in some cases, such as possibly Shell in Nigeria, it is claimed that 
the inward investment has contributed to the instability. However, these investments 
receive little comment. One recent exception is White Nile ltd, which has received a good 
deal of hostile press in both Europe and the US for announcing that it intended to explore 
the gas and oil reserves in Sudan. The press reacted as though this was a unique and 
somewhat disturbing development in the international business environment. In fact 
however, what was unusual about the White Nile case was not that a firm from the West 
was willing to invest in a war torn region, but simply that a relatively small company had 
been set up for the specific purpose of doing so, rather than this being undertaken by one 
of the world’s largest firms.  
On July 22nd 2009, four years after the UN set up a Peace-building Commission, the UN 
Security Council outlined the issues facing a post-conflict country. “The first is the need 
for a strong leader to stop ‘international agencies’ turf wars. The second is for money to 
be released in good time. Humanitarian funds come out of emergency budgets; peace-
building usually comes out of development budgets. The UN cannot stop war unless it is 
also able to win the peace.” The role of Inward FDI in stimulating development, building 
capacity and generating growth has been well investigated, however little is known about 
FDI in the context of corruption, conflict and post conflict. 
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Given the importance of this issue, and the comment in the popular press, the academic 
literature has had little to say about investments by MNEs in conflict zones.  
 
In general, one reason perhaps why so little has been written about FDI in conflict zones, 
is that the assumption is that this is simply resource seeking FDI, where natural resources 
can only be obtained from a limited set of locations. However, this is rather simplistic 
now. Security concerns for staff has increased, and potentially the risks to investing 
overseas in conflict locations are not only felt abroad, but may also lead to attacks on 
their business in other parts of the world, either through protest groups or terrorism. 
 
While the literature on corruption contends that corrupt locations, or those with weak 
institutions are less likely to attract FDI, it nevertheless remains true that locations with 
weak institutions still attract large quantities of FDI, and that the subject of the 
relationship between FDI and the host country was a matter of some dispute at a recent 
G8 summit1. 
 
In more general terms, links between local or national governance structures and FDI 
have been explored, see for example Bhaumik et al (2009) or Frynas et al (2006) and the 
references therein. Theory suggests that better governance is associated with 
development, following la Porta et al (1998a, b), and that in turn firms are more likely to 
invest in locations with good governance and institutions. However, a lot of empirical 
evidence refutes this; see for example Driffield et al (2009). Murshed (2002) for example 
highlights the role that control and access to natural resources plays in local conflicts, 
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particularly in developing countries. As such, it is likely that MNEs will get drawn into 
this, either by accident or design. At the same time, within the context of corporate social 
responsibility, how firms respond to these challenges, and how they are perceived by 
home country stakeholders is becoming more important.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we discuss the very limited literature 
available for this area of research. In section 3 we outline our 4 key hypotheses and their 
theoretical basis. In section 4 we describe our empirical specification. In section 5 we 
discuss the empirical results. Finally, section 6 concludes our analysis.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Given the importance of this question, there is amazingly little on the links between 
conflict, post conflict and FDI. There is a large economics literature on the impact of 
institutional quality on FDI inflow, and the general conclusion is that weak institutions 
adversely affect FDI. At the same time, there a more limited  international business 
literature on the impact of institutions on MNE strategies, see for example Meyer et al 
(2009). These literatures however seldom inform each other, the former content to note 
that FDI is deterred by weak institutions (with the underlying inference that the 
Washington Consensus should be adopted to alleviate this problem), and the latter 
content to focus on the actions of firms after the investment decision is taken.  
There is, however, a paucity of literature about how FDI or, more specifically, MNEs, the 
agents that fund these investments, influence or shape institutional quality in the host 
countries. Indeed, much (if not all) of the discussion about the influence of MNEs and 
their home countries on institutions in the developing world view the process through the 
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prism of Marxian views about imperialism (for the seminal work in this area see Griffin 
et al., 1985). The institutional literature that IB theory draws on to a significant extent is 
largely mute about this issue. Yet, we know that institutions are not static, and that they 
evolve over time. 
The literature on FDI in developing countries views political capital within the context of 
the resource based view of the firm. Frynas et al (2006) for example highlight the 
importance of first mover advantage in the context of generating political capital. 
Equally, there is a relatively large literature seeking to link FDI to corruption (see for 
example Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Javorcik and Wei (2008) argue that increased risk (in 
the form of increased corruption) reduces the likelihood of FDI. However, very little has 
been done on analysing the types of firms who invest in systematically risky 
environments. Addison and Murshed (2001) highlight the fiscal dimension to conflict 
resolution, highlighting the role that inequality can play in stimulating local conflicts. 
Multinationals investing in unstable locations run the risk of being seen as more than 
innocent bystanders, where their investments serve to increase inequality, or increase the 
returns to certain resources. However, analysis of investments in conflict areas presents a 
subtle distinction from this literature. The key questions concern the motivation of firms 
to engage in FDI in such locations, and the types of firms so motivated. We therefore 
seek to extend the existing literature by seeking to explain this FDI decision.  
As has recently been noted in the UN, conflict and post-conflict countries are beset by a 
large range of problems, including corruption, lack of governance structures and 
protection of property rights. Existing literature reflects the obvious, that such conditions 
deter FDI, at a time, it may be argued, that new capital investment is crucial for both 
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infrastructure and private sector development, just as civil society is required for the 
rebuilding of the state. This point is also made by Rose-Ackerman (2008) in an analysis 
of post conflict countries, highlighting the role that corruption plays in facilitating 
development in the short term in post conflict countries. However, as Rose-Ackerman 
(2008) points out, institutions must replace this informal process, and alleviate its cause.   
However, this literature does not focus on the nature of the firms investing or what their 
motivation is. There are two theoretical frameworks that offer some useful insight here. 
The first is that offered by Peng et al (2008) which focuses on the institution-based view 
of strategy, and stresses the role that institutions can have in making markets work, and 
facilitating strategic decisions through information flows. This however leaves open the 
question of governance at the firm level, and the decision making process that leads a 
firm to invest in a location beset by corruption. Standard analysis of governance tends to 
refer to principal – agent relationships. This offers an extension of Doukas and Lang 
(2003) who, for example, highlight the importance of ownership structures in explaining 
FDI, though this in terms of the risks associated with FDI, and the returns to “external” 
shareholders. One could argue therefore, following the link made by Peng (2006) that 
FDI into corrupt regions must be very much a core activity, driven by market 
considerations. 
 
3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES 
The stylised literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) has at its basis the ownership-location-internalisation (OLI) framework (Buckley 
and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1979, 1988). The basic proposition of the OLI model 
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continues to be valid, in the sense that MNEs expand into other countries and continents 
to take advantage of local resources and by leveraging their unique capabilities (Luo and 
Tung, 2007). Much of the literature on FDI and institutional quality is discussed in 
Bhaumik et al (2009) who argue that institutions provide location advantages, facilitating 
transactions and reducing risk. Similar arguments are made by Javorcik and Wei (2008) 
or Daude et al (2004) – who argue that increased corruption increases the transactions 
costs of the investor, and the level of risk. Frynas et al (2006) take a different perspective, 
pointing out that engaging successfully with corrupt officials, or malleable institutions 
may be a source of first mover advantage. It is clear that the analysis of institutions with 
respect to risk, and possibly transaction costs are directly applicable to the analysis of 
FDI in conflict zones, but the extent to which such locations also offer greater rewards, 
perhaps through first mover advantage or market power more generally are seldom 
discussed.  
 
Despite the lack of literature in this area, there are two frameworks that offer some useful 
insight here. The first is that offered by Peng et al (2008) which focuses on the 
institution-based view of strategy. This builds on earlier work by North (1990) which 
stresses the role that institutions can have in making markets work, and facilitating 
strategic decisions through information flows. What this therefore suggests is that in 
conflict zones, the other parts of the Peng (2006) tripod of industry based competition 
and firm specific resources dominate.  This however leaves open the question of 
governance at the firm level, and the decision making process that leads a firm to invest 
in a location beset by conflict.  
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CSR  
With regard to business-state relations, the concept of CSR has been utilized to explain 
how large corporations not only have an economic duty towards their shareholders but 
also have wider legal and societal responsibilities. For example, in ‘stakeholder’ theory, 
attention is placed on the fact that firms necessarily have a ‘normative’ and ‘moral’ 
obligation to all stakeholders, including not just its immediate shareholders, but the 
wider citizenry (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Gibson 2000). Wood and Logsdon (2001) 
on the other hand see the corporation as having certain rights and responsibilities to 
various actors precipitating the need for firms to act as good corporate citizens. However 
few of these papers present a concrete framework for assessing the strengths, limits and 
scale of CSR activity being undertaken by the firm. Thus in this paper we return to the 
routes of CSR theory and operationalise Carroll’s original 1979 CSR framework and its 
subsequent refinements (Carroll 1991, 1998; 1999) as it offers the researcher a simple, 
yet not simplistic way of conceptualising CSR activity and measuring the type and scale 
of CSR activity undertaken. 
 
Carroll’s framework 
 
Carroll presents four CSR categories, which “are not mutually exclusive, nor are they 
intended to portray a continuum with economic concerns on one end and social concerns 
on the other. They are neither cumulative nor additive. Rather they are ordered in the 
figure only to suggest what might be termed their fundamental role in the evolution of 
importance,” (Carroll, 1979, p500), as presented in his 1991 iteration below. 
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Carroll’s CSR Pyramid  
Carroll (1991, p 42), The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Towards the Moral Management of 
Organizational Stakeholders 
 
Economic Responsibilities 
Economic responsibilities are seen by Carroll as the first responsibility of business. 
Carroll describes the business institution as the basic economic unit in the society. As 
such it has a responsibility to produce goods and services that society wants and to sell 
them at a profit. All other business roles are predicated on this fundamental assumption. 
Economic responsibilities are viewed as the most basic and important of all business 
roles and businesses should strive to maximize profits as this is the reason for their 
existence. Thus, natural resource extraction for profit in a conflict zone could be 
interpreted as responding to a market demand and generating profit – the first 
responsibility of business (Carroll, 1979; 1991). 
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This suggests that the analysis of FDI in conflict locations needs to include a sectoral 
analysis. The company’s CSR image is potentially more important where external 
stakeholders are final consumers (i.e. the general public) than other businesses. Also, one 
can imagine that certain sectors are more resigned to investing in conflict regions than 
others. Extraction of minerals has historically been relatively sanguine about investing in 
trouble spots, driven by the location of the resources. 
 
H1: That FDI linked to natural resources is more likely to enter conflict regions.  
 
Legal Responsibilities 
“Just as society has sanctioned the economic system by permitting business to assume the 
productive role, as a partial fulfillment of the "social contract," it has also laid down the 
ground rules, the laws and regulations under which business is expected to operate” 
(Carroll, 1979 p. 500). In other words, society expects businesses to fulfill their economic 
responsibilities within the law. In his 1991 refinement of this model, Carroll also asserts 
that the rules and regulations of not just the firm’s country of origin but also those of 
‘local governments of the host communities in which they operate’ (Carroll, 1991, p 41) 
should be observed. Of course within conflict zones, ‘the law’ within such host 
communities maybe difficult to define, access or interpret. This places a greater emphasis 
on the mitigating effects of home country institutions, and also the firms own corporate 
social responsibility and governance structures. 
 
In addition to highlighting firm level differences in the decision to invest in conflict 
locations, this also suggests a country level phenomenon, where firms from countries 
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with specific types of governance and culture are more likely to engage in FDI in conflict 
locations. It has been widely remarked that the strongest institutions are in the developed 
countries such as the US, Germany, the UK and Japan, so one may expect to see less 
investment from such locations. Within the set of developed country firms, one may 
expect to see higher levels of FDI into conflict zones from countries with higher levels of 
corruption and weaker institutions, for example Italy2.  
 
H2 – Firms from countries with weaker institutions are more likely to invest in 
conflict regions. 
 
Ethical Responsibilities 
Carroll describes these as “responsibilities (that) embody those standards, norms, or 
expectations that reflect a concern for what consumers, employees, shareholders and the 
community regard as fair, just, or in keeping with the respect or protection of 
stakeholders’ moral rights,” (Carroll, 1991 p. 41) i.e. responsibilities which go beyond 
the generation of profit for shareholders. He also states that “ethical responsibilities are ill 
defined and consequently are among the most difficult for business to deal with, but can 
be generalised as responsibilities that society expects of businesses over and above legal 
requirements,” (Carroll, 1979 p. 500). What society ‘expects’ requires the firm to make 
assumptions to consult stakeholders widely. In conflict zones and countries with weak 
institutional or governance arrangements, expectations maybe difficult to judge and 
different to those of stakeholders in developed countries; as a result the degree of 
‘ethical’ or CSR behavior will be determined by all, or a combination of (a) the view the 
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firm has of itself vis-à-vis ethical responsibilities; (b) pressure from stakeholders outside 
the host country on its activities; and (c) assumptions made by the firm of expectations 
from the host country. 
 
There has been a relatively wide literature in recent years on CSR within the context of 
international business, see for example Luo (2006), Rodriguez et al (2006), Husted and 
Allen (2006) and Strike et al (2006). Luo (2006) bases his analysis on political conduct of 
the firm generating a more socially desirable outcome. This analysis is then couched in 
terms of the relationship between the MNE and governments. The essential assertion of 
Luo (2006) is that corruption reduces engagement with governments by the firm. One can 
of course extend this argument beyond corruption, to more extreme examples of 
institutional breakdown, such as conflict. This adds to the explanation of why 
institutional failure (of whatever type) may deter FDI, but that does not explain why 
some firms still choose to invest in conflict areas. Rodriguez et al (2006) extend this 
rather to look at the interaction between business and government in a wider context.  As 
Rodriguez et al (2006) point out, of the three lenses of corruption, politics and CSR, CSR 
is by far the least investigated. In general however, this literature stresses CSR from the 
perspective of external stakeholders, for example the firm wanting to stress to customers 
the ethical sourcing or testing of products. Avoiding contentious locations is therefore an 
obvious extension of this, but it is therefore trivial to infer that firms who care little for 
their external stakeholders views of CSR are most likely to invest in conflict regions. 
Husted and Allen (2006) offer an interesting viewpoint on this, which is to distinguish 
between local and global CSR. Husted and Allen (2006) rely on Gnywali (1996) and 
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Spicer et al (2004) to distinguish between local and global CSR, based on whether the 
stakeholders are in the home or host country. This is particularly important in the context 
of conflict regions, where local (host country) CSR may not be an issue, but adverse 
commentary locally can hurt the company in its home country or elsewhere. This 
suggests that there will be country level differences in the propensity to invest in conflict 
regions. 
 
H3 Firms with less concern over CSR are more likely to invest in conflict countries. 
 
Discretionary Responsibilities  
Discretionary or philanthropic responsibilities are those that are not demanded of 
business and are left to management’s discretion and individual judgment. Society might 
offer no clear or confusing signals as to what is ‘expected’ in this area. “These roles are 
purely voluntary, and the decision to assume them is guided only by a business’s desire to 
engage in social roles not mandated, not required by law, and not even generally expected 
by businesses in an ethical sense.” (Carroll, 1979 p.500). Due to the vagueness/ambiguity 
surrounding this category Carroll gave some examples of discretionary responsibilities 
which include making philanthropic contributions or training the hard-core unemployed. 
In conflict zones this may instead mean provision of health care, education, child welfare 
and so on. Firms may assume this activity even if it is not expected by domestic or local 
stakeholders, but as a way of justifying their activity to ‘external’ stakeholders – 
demonstrating that they are ‘good Corporate Citizens’. Conversely if operating in a 
conflict zone leads the firm, as previously alluded to, to destabilises the status quo, then it 
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could be argued that the firm has behaved a ‘poor citizen’ or has failed to supply 
activities akin to citizenship rights. 
 
There is however very little understanding as to how the level of ownership concentration 
of MNE’s can affect whether to invest abroad and also the size of fdi. One of the very 
few studies in this respect is by Blonigen, Ellis and Fansten (2000) who highlight the 
effects of business groupings on FDI via two channels. (1) Direct incentive effects 
generated via standard product and factor market interactions, whereby firms in a 
business group with cross ownership consider the congestion effects of further FDI into a 
market. (2) Indirect incentive effects generated by sharing of information across firms in 
a business group, which reduces entry costs for subsequent FDI. There may however be 
some disincentives (agency costs) if there are separation of control and cash flow rights, 
pyramid ownership and cross-holdings, thus weakening the positive incentive effects. In 
the latter cases, controlling shareholders earn rents through control of corporations at the 
expense of minority shareholders. So they have an incentive to bribe the state rulers and 
get away with the expropriation of minority shareholder, thus protecting their rents 
domestically, rather than venturing abroad. A more indirect link between these issues is 
provided by the rather limited literature on disclosures. If a firm becomes a MNE it opens 
itself up to scrutiny from a larger number of regulators and monitoring can be intense, 
given regulators' worries about transfer pricing, adherence to GAAP/IFRS if the 
investment is in US/Europe, etc. If a controlling owner wants to avoid such scrutiny 
and/or avoid the costs of compliance, it may prefer not to internationalise, and this effect 
would then counteract the desire to diversify assets across countries to mitigate country-
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specific risk. Standard analysis of governance tends to refer to principal – agent 
relationships. This analysis is extended by Doukas and Travalos (1998), Doukas (1995) 
and Doukas and Lang (2003) who link the (foreign) investment decision to shareholder 
returns. Doukas and Lang (2003) for example highlight the importance of ownership 
structures in explaining FDI, though this is in terms of the risks associated with FDI, and 
the returns to “external” sharholders. The analysis of Doukas and Lang (2003) 
distinguishes between core and non core FDI, rather than identifying different risks, or 
required risk premia per se, though the analysis may be applied to risky investments more 
generally. As firms from more corrupt home countries become visible participants in the 
market for overseas investment, typically operating in countries with dubious corporate 
governance credentials, the relationship between ownership (and hence corporate 
governance) structures and the decision to invest overseas assumes importance. Yet, a 
literature on this subject is largely missing, important exceptions being Doukas and Lang 
(2003). Doukas and Lang (2003) essentially argue that non core FDI is a feature of 
decisions taken by entrenched managers, who may be looking for expansion, at the 
expense of shareholder value. One could argue therefore, following the link made by 
Peng (2006) that FDI into conflict zones must be very much a core activity, driven by 
market considerations. As such, while it is risky, it also presents the potential for higher 
returns. This is likely therefore to be associated with concentrated, rather than dispersed 
ownership, where large shareholders are actively involved in the running of the firm.  
However, in a western context one could extend this argument further. Firms with more 
concentrated ownership are less likely to face scrutiny from other shareholders (Bhaumik, 
Driffield and Pal 2010) and as such more likely to engage in activities that may otherwise 
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attract criticism. As such, the link between such investments and ownership structures 
may not be restricted to the apportioning of the profit stream, but in terms of the wider 
considerations of the decisions to invest in unstable locations. 
At a lower level of concentration however, one can expect that incentive effects (both 
direct and indirect) may predominate this kind of rentseeking behaviour (3) and (4); at a 
higher level of concentration, however, rentseeking effects may dominate, giving rise to 
negative net effect. Whilst in developed economies, boards of directors are happy to 
engage in a control function, that within emerging economies, the control function 
performed by the directors or major shareholders is weakened as a result of a) large 
family or government stakes b) oligarchic relationship with regulators c) no perceived 
risk of sanction, usually because larger block holdings exist.  
 
To a large extent, persistence of concentrated ownership reflects institutional weaknesses, 
especially absence of specialised intermediaries in capital markets. Strategic decisions for 
these companies are often taken by a closely knit group of controlling owners, without 
the involvement of other stakeholders. At the same time, it is often in the interest of this 
group to diversify its business interests outside the home country, largely to mitigate 
location specific risk (Rugman, 1975). Second, formal membership of corporate groups 
and informal networks facilitates access to internal capital markets, which makes it easier 
to raise the funding necessary for overseas expansion (Tasi, 2002; Child and Pleister, 
2003; Liu, 2005; Erdener and Shapiro, 2005). 
 
However, as discussed above, the relationship between ownership concentration and 
outward FDI decisions is more complex than the treatments thus far offered in the 
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literature would suggest. It is now well established that firms with concentrated 
ownership may be opaque, with low levels of protection for minority shareholders. In 
many countries there is evidence of “tunnelling” in group-affiliated companies that 
typically have concentrated ownership (Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, 2002), and a 
general unwillingness to subject themselves to scrutiny. There is for example a relatively 
well developed literature on ownership concentration and the relatively low levels of 
voluntary disclosures (Chau and Gray, 2002; Berglof and Pajuste, 2005; Luo, 2005). 
Engaging in FDI typically involves scrutiny by various stakeholders, including 
regulators, creditors, shareholders and (where appropriate) JV partners. Not all of whom 
may have close operational relationships with the MNE. The transactions costs of 
meeting the consequent disclosure standards (or the cost of bribery, in certain contexts) 
can be substantial. If these costs outweigh the benefits associated with (a) information 
sharing within a business group and (b) asset risk diversification, it may be rational for a 
firm with concentrated ownership to operate within the boundaries of its home country 
where institutional shortcomings allows (or even facilitates) opacity. This suggests 
therefore that firms of this type, or from countries with weak institutions and historically 
concentrated ownership may find FDI to countries with weak institutions appealing. 
Bhaumik et al (2010) for example, in one of the few papers to explicitly link fdi decisions 
to ownership structure, show how concentrated ownership in emerging economies makes 
firms less likely to seek the types of scrutiny associated with investing in western 
countries.  However, in the context of making investments that may be open to criticism, 
either due to excessive risk, or ethical objections, concentrated ownership may make this 
more likely.    Concentrated ownership facilitates more risky or controversial FDI,  as 
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there are fewer constituents to get on board. Thus ownership concentration faciliates 
more FDI, but it is also likely to facilitate more FDI in more ethically dubious areas,  
Equally, such firms may be less concerned about adverse comment on their actions due to 
the relative weakness of other stakeholders. 
 
H4: firms with concentrated ownership are more likely to engage in FDI to conflict 
zones.  
4. THE MODEL 
The probability of a firm entering a location is determined by expectations of future 
profits (e).  In the expression below T is the expected life of the investment, and r is the 
discount rate: 
 
Prob(FDI) = 1 [ ( )1 10   rpT p t pe ]                                   (1) 
 
This is clearly unobservable, but this model can be re-written as a function of a vector of 
firm and home country characteristics such that: 
 
( )1 1
0
  rpT p t pe  = ( ),( jij  )                        (2) 
 
Where ij is a vector of firm level effects and j a vector a home country effects.  
This then translates into equation (2a) - a panel probit model that explains variations in 
the propensity to engage in FDI to conflict regions at the firm level. The panel data 
methodology allows us to control for firm-level heterogeneity via our explanatory 
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variables which we discuss in detail below. A probit model is ideal for studying data with 
an independent variable which is binomially distributed. You can express probit models 
in terms of the event probability:  
)()1(Pr
1



i
i
ii xFDIob                                    (2a) 
where   is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The probit model is 
essentially a linear regression of the Z score of the event probability on the dependent 
variable (FDI). To interpret the coefficient estimates therefore, researchers generally look 
at the estimated signs of the regression coefficients or calculate the marginal effects. We 
leave the latter for the appendix and the former are reported in the text. For more 
information on probit models see Liao (1994). 
 
 
ittiitititit
j
it SHAREFDI   ΩLOCATIONSECTORSΛδFDI10             
(3) 
 
In equation (3), the independent variable is jitFDI  by firm i at time t, in conflict location 
j equals 1 if a multinational company has a subsidiary located in a conflict country; and 
equals zero otherwise. The SHARE variable measures each firm’s largest shareholder, it 
is thus a measure of ownership concentration. The vector FDI includes a set of 
explanatory variables that are often included in an FDI model, these include: profit, sales, 
sales squared, cash flow, the ratio of fixed intangible assets to total assets, the number of 
subsidiaries, firms age and age squared. The first five of these variables are all measured 
in logarithms. The vector SECTORS contains seven sector-specific dummy variables 
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based on NACE 2-digit codes. These are: Mining (included to capture resource seeking 
FDI), Manufacturing, Agriculture, Transportation Services, Public Services, High-
Technology Services and Low-Technology Services. Finally, the vector LOCATION 
includes region-specific dummy variables or country-specific dummy variables 
depending on the specification. The region-specific dummies are South America and the 
Caribbean, OECD, Asia and Africa; whilst the country-specific dummies include the UK, 
US, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, France, Switzerland, Japan, Brazil, India and China.  
Finally, within the panel framework, the error term is composed of firm level effects and 
time effects (which are captured by time dummies). This allows for us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level. 
 
5. DATA 
This paper uses ORBIS a firm-level dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk, which is a 
leading electronic publisher of annual accounts information for millions of firms across 
the whole globe. We only use a subset of this database. For a range of developing 
countries, which includes countries currently experiencing some form of conflict, we 
download a number of statistics that are frequently included in a standard FDI model for 
the parent multinational companies that have a majority stake in a subsidiary based in a 
developing country. No information about the subsidiaries is utilised as this data is often 
missing, we are therefore focusing on the parent. We create an unbalanced panel of firms 
consisting of 15360 observations over the period 1999-2006. In total there are 2858 firms 
that have invested in regions with a low level of human development3. Out of these, 290 
have invested in a region currently engaged in some sort of conflict. This allows us to 
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construct our dependent variable jitFDI that distinguishes between the two and allows us 
to run a simple panel probit model.  
Chris, I want some probit algebra here specified in panel terms 
The key variables included in our analysis are profit, sales, cash-flow, a ratio of 
intangible fixed assets to total assets, the number of subsidiaries, firm age and the largest 
shareholders percentage of ownership. In addition to this we generate: (1) a set of sectoral 
dummies based on NACE 2-digit codes, these are mining, manufacturing, agriculture, 
transportation services, public services, high-technology services and low-technology 
services4; (2) a set of region specific dummies based on each multinational’s home 
region, these are South America and the Caribbean, the OECD, Asia and Africa; and (3) a 
set of country specific dummies based on each multinational’s home country, these are 
identified for the UK, US, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, France, Switzerland, Japan, 
Brazil, China and India.  
To determine which countries are categorised as experiencing some sort of conflict, in 
order to generate the CONFLICT dummy, we take advantage of the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) constructed by countryrisk.com. The ICRG data is chosen 
because….They use 12 measures of political risk to assess a number of different 
countries. One of the measures is called Internal Conflict and is according to ICRG: 
“An assessment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential 
impact on governance. The highest rating is given to those countries where 
there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government 
does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect, against its own 
people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going civil 
war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a 
maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 
points equates to Very Low Risk and a score of 0 points to Very High Risk.” 
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The three subcomponents ICRG distinguishes between are Civil War/Coup Threat, 
Terrorism/Political Violence and Civil Disorder. In order to categorise the ‘conflict 
countries’ we average each countries score from 2000 to 2007, if this score is less than 
6.5 the country is classified as a conflict country and therefore all of the parent companies 
that have a subsidiary in that corresponding country are identified as a company that 
invests in a conflict region. The conflict countries identified are Bangladesh, Colombia, 
Congo DR, Haiti, Iraq, Nigeria, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.  
 
6 RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
Before moving to the econometric analysis, it is important to discuss some features of the 
data. Firstly, Table 1 highlights the differences in intuitional quality between different 
regions/countries used in the subsequent analysis. The data is again taken from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) constructed by countryrisk.com. As well as 
their measure of conflict (discussed above) they also have statistics on corruption, 
bureaucratic quality and investment profile. The data in Table 1 contains an average 
taken from 2000-2007 for each of these variables. Corruption is an assessment of 
corruption within the political system it has maximum score of 6. Bureaucratic Quality 
measures the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy it has a maximum score 
of 4. Investment Profile is an assessment of factors affecting investment risk that are not 
covered by other political, economic and financial risk components within the ICRG, it 
has a maximum score of 12. 
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Table 1: Institutional Quality by Home country: ICRG Indicators 
Country  Corruption Average  Bureaucratic Quality Investment Profile 
Brazil 2.65 2.05 7.10 
China 1.73 2.00 7.34 
France 3.42 3.37 10.81 
Germany 4.56 4.00 10.77 
India 2.45 2.13 7.53 
Italy 2.87 3.00 10.58 
Japan 3.20 2.73 9.78 
Spain 4.10 3.97 11.38 
Switzerland 4.61 4.00 11.20 
United Kingdom 4.63 3.37 11.36 
United States 4.17 4.00 11.04 
Africa 1.98 1.22 7.44 
South America & Caribbean 2.47 2.05 8.07 
OECD 4.20 3.66 11.14 
Asia 2.14 1.98 8.31 
 
 
As can be seen across each country/region and each variable there is considerable 
heterogeneity. The data follows a consistent and familiar pattern, with the African and 
Asian regions scoring relatively poorly in terms of corruption compared with the OECD. 
This result is unsurprising. Perhaps the most interesting statistics are those associated 
with Italy. In general, Italy has the worst rating in terms of corruption, bureaucratic 
quality and investment profile compared with all of its European neighbours. 
Unsurprisingly, India, China and Brazil all have lower ratings of a very similar nature to 
one another.  
 
Table 2 gives some simple descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in the 
following analysis. Included are the mean, standard deviation and the maximum and 
minimum values for each variable. In addition to this Table A1.1 in Appendix A contains 
the correlation matrix for the FDI variables. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ConflictFDI 15360 0.2458 0.4306 0 1 
ln Profit 15360 10.2624 2.7433 -1.6714 17.4925 
ln Sales 15360 12.8843 2.5032 1.5612 19.5117 
ln Sales2 15360 172.2715 63.9820 2.4373 380.7079 
ln Cash Flow 15360 10.4308 2.6873 -0.4222 17.3960 
ln Fixed Intangible Assets /Total 
Assets 15360 -3.5075 2.1222 -16.3221 -0.1604 
Age 15360 45.7067 42.5107 1 352 
Age2 15360 3896.1460 7785.8530 1 123904 
Number of Subsidiaries 15360 62.7839 112.1029 1 1738 
largest Shareholder 15360 50.7283 34.4599 0.24 100 
Mining 15360 0.0298 0.1699 0 1 
Manufacturing 15360 0.5145 0.4998 0 1 
Agriculture 15360 0.0094 0.0964 0 1 
Transportation 15360 0.0458 0.2090 0 1 
Public Services 15360 0.0068 0.0820 0 1 
High Technology Services  15360 0.2156 0.4112 0 1 
Low Technology Services  15360 0.1460 0.3531 0 1 
UK 15360 0.0498 0.2175 0 1 
SPAIN 15360 0.1803 0.3845 0 1 
PORTUGAL 15360 0.0082 0.0902 0 1 
JAPAN 15360 0.0316 0.1749 0 1 
ITALY 15360 0.0742 0.2621 0 1 
GERMANY 15360 0.0473 0.2122 0 1 
FRANCE 15360 0.1667 0.3727 0 1 
USA 15360 0.1694 0.3751 0 1 
SWI 15360 0.0221 0.1471 0 1 
BRAZIL 15360 0.0005859 0.0241998 0 1 
CHINA 15360 0.0034505 0.0586416 0 1 
INDIA 15360 0.0021484 0.0463029 0 1 
SA and CAR 15360 0.0070 0.0836 0 1 
OECD 15360 0.9264 0.2612 0 1 
AFRICA 15360 0.0113 0.1055 0 1 
ASIA 15360 0.0410 0.1983 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 3 presents the results of our baseline probit specification (column 1). This 
illustrates the firm level determinants of a firm’s decision to invest in a conflict location. 
More specifically they represent the decision of a firm that has already chosen to invest in 
low income countries with weak institutions, to also invest in a conflict location. Given 
this particularly restrictive question, the models work particularly well. The control 
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variables work as expected, profitability is associated with this type of FDI, while firm 
size is inversely associated with this behaviour, though with a turning point, suggesting 
that it is the smaller and largest firms that are most likely to invest in conflict locations. 
Equally, the effect of age is positive, but again with a turning point, suggesting that the 
most established firms shy away from this type of activity. The results concerning age 
and size can also be linked to the issue of CSR. Small firms are perhaps too small to 
attract criticism, or perhaps are set up for the specific purpose of investing in sensitive 
locations, while the largest firms are extremely diversified and may be able to hide 
certain activities. The other control variables, subsidiaries, cash flow and intangible assets 
work as expected. Of more interest is the ownership concentration variable. This is 
positive for the first model, such that concentrated firms are more likely to invest in 
conflict locations. This is consistent with the discussion of both CSR and the work of 
Peng (2008) and Doukas and Lang (2003) that is linked in H1. There is also strong 
support for hypotheses two and three. From even within the developed world there are 
large differences in the propensity to invest in conflict countries. Spain, Italy and France 
appear far more likely to invest in conflict countries than Germany, the USA or the UK. 
This provides support for the arguments around hypothesis two, in that there are 
significant differences in the propensity of different countries to invest in conflict 
regions, and that these are explained by differences in home country institutions. This is 
then extended further to include transition countries, with India and Brazil being 
significantly more likely to invest in conflict locations.  
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Table 3: Econometric Results 
 
dependent Variable: 
FDI 
1 Se   2  Se 3  Se 
VARIABLES Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
ln Profit 0.0418** 0.0167 0.0352** 0.0171 0.0350** 0.0171 
ln Sales -0.357*** 0.0408 -0.351*** 0.0434 -0.354*** 0.0435 
ln Sales2 0.0138*** 0.00158 0.0146*** 0.00166 0.0148*** 0.00166 
ln Cash Flow 0.0352** 0.0175 0.0663*** 0.018 0.0657*** 0.0179 
ln Fixed Intangible 
Assets /Total Assets 0.0414*** 0.00669 0.0427*** 0.00696 0.0432*** 0.00697 
Age 0.00333*** 0.000609 0.00532*** 0.000631 0.00515*** 0.00063 
Age2 -1.03e-05*** 2.99E-06 -1.69e-05*** 3.10E-06 -1.61e-05*** 3.09E-06 
Number of Subsidiaries 0.00176*** 0.000151 0.00163*** 0.000148 0.00163*** 0.000148 
largest Shareholder 0.00215*** 0.000372 0.000204 0.000429 0.000321 0.00043 
Mining 0.498*** 0.0755 0.597*** 0.0802 0.594*** 0.0798
Manufacturing 0.174*** 0.0478 0.231*** 0.0503 0.231*** 0.0503 
Agriculture 0.796*** 0.117 0.999*** 0.122 1.005*** 0.123 
Transportation -0.0449 0.0641 -0.0932 0.0653 -0.103 0.0653 
Public Services 0.0705 0.155 0.26 0.159 0.269* 0.159 
High Technology 
Services  0.153*** 0.0521 0.259*** 0.0549 0.258*** 0.0549 
Low Technology 
Services  -0.0833 0.0587 0.022 0.0603 0.0156 0.0605 
UK     -0.158*** 0.0583 -0.126** 0.0586 
SPAIN     0.292*** 0.0416 0.321*** 0.0421 
PORTUGAL     -0.758*** 0.177 -0.728*** 0.177 
JAPAN     -0.838*** 0.0812 -0.805*** 0.0816 
ITALY     0.905*** 0.0488 0.934*** 0.0492 
GERMANY     -0.329*** 0.0624 -0.300*** 0.0627 
FRANCE     0.143*** 0.0391 0.171*** 0.0395 
USA     -0.156*** 0.0403 -0.123*** 0.0408 
SWI     0.181** 0.0707 0.211*** 0.071 
BRAZIL     0.591* 0.343 0.621* 0.343 
CHINA     -0.224 0.251 -0.197 0.252 
INDIA     1.063*** 0.231 1.096*** 0.231 
SA and CAR 1.366*** 0.207         
OECD 0.780*** 0.161         
AFRICA 1.269*** 0.188     0.556***   
ASIA 0.569*** 0.174   
Constant -0.397 0.303 -0.222 0.289 -0.233   
Observations 15360   15360   15360   
Pseudo R-squared 0.0952   0.1283   0.1299   
Notes: *** indicates significant at the 1 per cent level, ** significance at the 5 per cent level, and * at the 10 per cent level 
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Finally, we also find unqualified success for hypothesis four. Not surprisingly mining and 
agriculture are positive and significant, but our results show that the extent of this 
strategy goes well beyond what may have been thought of as the traditional sectors of this 
type of activity. High-technology industries, which include financial services, and 
manufacturing show a high probability of being attracted to such locations. 
Transportation, not surprisingly, is less likely to be attracted to conflict countries. 
 
The subsequent columns in the results table seek to examine hypotheses two and three in 
more detail. These show that firms from Africa, South America and the Caribbean, and 
Asia, once they have engaged in FDI to developing countries, are then more likely to 
invest in conflict countries. That is not to say however that this phenomenon is limited to 
the developing or transition world, as the results also show that OECD membership is 
associated with investment in conflict countries.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to explain the prevalence of firms to 
invest in conflict countries. Numerous authors have pointed out the extent to which 
political instability deters FDI, and rather fewer, typically from outside the IB or strategy 
area have commented on particular examples of western firms investing in politically 
unstable or ethically questionable locations. However, what we have shown here is that 
the relatively standard models that seek to explain variations in FDI propensity, including 
size, intangible assets, subsidiaries and age, still explain the marginal decision to invest in 
a conflict region, even taking into account the decision to invest in a low income country 
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with relatively weak institutions. Our analysis suggests that of some 2858 firms that have 
chosen to invest in such countries, over 290 have invested in conflict countries. Thus, 
while existing literature that points out the extent to which internal conflict deters FDI 
may well be correct, it by no means deters all firms. 
 
Further, we have shown that ownership structures and institutions in the home country 
are important determinants of this decision. Firms from countries with relatively strong 
traditions of CSR are less likely to engage in conflict FDI, while firms from countries 
with a rather contrasting culture are not deterred. In terms of further work, this suggests a 
need for a better analysis of CSR at the country level, to better understand the 
motivations of certain countries to invest in such locations. Beyond this, it also suggests a 
link to possible case study or survey work to determine more about the activities of these 
investors on an individual basis.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Table A.1.1 Correlation Matrix 
 
 
  Variable 1 2 3 5 6 7 9 10 
1 FDI 1               
2 ln Profit 0.2464 1             
3 ln Sales 0.2381 0.9278 1           
5 ln Cash Flow 0.249 0.9579 0.9263 1         
6 
ln Fixed Intangible Assets 
/Total Assets 0.1409 0.4021 0.4061 0.3854 1       
7 Age 0.1457 0.3795 0.4076 0.3864 0.1461 1     
9 Number of Subsidiaries 0.2491 0.4571 0.4788 0.4611 0.2171 0.2188 1   
10 largest Shareholder -0.0734 -0.3632 -0.3548 -0.3435 -0.288 -0.216 -0.1742 1 
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Table A.1.2 Marginal Effects 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ln Profit 0.0126 0.0104 0.0104 
ln Sales -0.1079 -0.1042 -0.1050 
ln Sales2 0.0042 0.0043 0.0044 
ln Cash Flow 0.0106 0.0197 0.0195 
ln Fixed Intangible Assets 
/Total Assets 0.0125 0.0127 0.0128 
Age 0.0010 0.0016 0.0015 
Age2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of Subsidiaries 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
largest Shareholder 0.0006 0.0001 0.0001 
Mining 0.1729 0.2090 0.2077 
Manufacturing 0.0525 0.0683 0.0682 
Agriculture 0.2913 0.3691 0.3713 
Transportation -0.0133 -0.0267 -0.0294 
Public Services 0.0218 0.0844 0.0876 
High Technology Services  0.0476 0.0811 0.0805 
Low Technology Services  -0.0246 0.0066 0.0046 
UK   -0.0443 -0.0358 
SPAIN   0.0924 0.1021 
PORTUGAL   -0.1587 -0.1545 
JAPAN   -0.1719 -0.1675 
ITALY   0.3259 0.3372 
GERMANY   -0.0860 -0.0794 
FRANCE   0.0439 0.0529 
USA   -0.0443 -0.0353 
SWI   0.0571 0.0672 
BRAZIL   0.2084 0.2199 
CHINA   -0.0607 -0.0538 
INDIA   0.3944 0.4069 
SA and CAR 0.5043   0.1939 
OECD 0.1744
AFRICA 0.4708     
ASIA 0.1997     
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 Please address correspondence to Nigel Driffield, Economics and Strategy Group, Aston Business School, 
Aston Triangle, Birmingham, B4 7ET, United Kingdom; email: n.l.driffield@aston.ac.uk. The authors 
gratefully acknowledge support from the ESRC under RES-062-23-0986 
1 On 7th June 2007 the (then) UK Prime Minister made a speech at the G8 summit, attacking the lack of 
progress in Russia’s institutional development, and suggested that if this was not rectified, Russia would 
lose out on a lot of inward FDI. This assertion was immediately rejected by Mr Putin, not because he 
claimed that Russia was strengthening its institutions, but because he saw no link between institutional 
quality and FDI. 
2 A Wall St Journal Article published on the 9th of Novemeber 2009 discusses a report published by the 
Heinrich Böll Foundation criticising Italian energy giant Eni SpA’s plans to squeeze oil from the tar sands 
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of  the Republic of Congo. “This is a particularly dirty form of oil production and it is being planned for an 
area that’s highly sensitive in ecological terms,” said Dr. Sarah Wykes, one of the authors of the report. In 
reply Eni said that the tar-sands project would involve “no destruction of primary forest; no occupation of 
existing farmland; no impact on areas of high biodiversity; and no…resettlement of people.” This is a 
classic example of the sort investment that this paper is interested in studying.  
3 We exclude companies where the parent is based in a tax haven.  
4 The NACE 2-digit codes for each of these sectors are as follows: Mining 10 to 14; Manufacturing 15 to 37; 
High-Tech Services 64 65, 66, 67, 70, 71 72 73 74; Agriculture 01, 02, 05; Transportation 60, 61, 62, 63; 
Low-Tech Services 50 51 52 55 60 63 90 91 93 95. This classification is consistent with Erostat. 
